Abstract: Economic principal-agent theory deals with asymmetric information. It has two aspects. (i) If one person is better informed than another one, the former may outwit the latter. Kauṭilya, the Arthaśāstra's author, and other artha or dharma authors had a very good understanding of outwitting. (ii) Economic theory teaches that the person in command of superior knowledge may not always be able to benefit from this knowledge. He may need the uninformed side to agree to some mutually beneficial venture. The very fact of asymmetric information may then harm also the informed side. Judging from the literature surveyed by the author, the artha and dharma literature had no explicit (openly expressed) understanding of this second aspect. In the author's mind, this discussion is related to the "Varuṇa rule". This rule (specified in the Manusmṛti) stipulates that the king is to throw confiscated property into water. We explain this apparent waste of resources as an implicit solution to the second aspect of principal-agent theory mentioned above.
Introduction
Old Indian texts exhibit an amazingly clever perspective on human agency. 1 Within economics, this is dealt with under the heading of principal-agent theory. Roughly speaking, principal-agent theory deals with the problems that arise from asymmetric information, with one person being better informed than another one. In recent times, economists have given due credit to Kauṭilya, the Arthaśāstra's author, as a very early principal-agent theorist.
Principal-agent theory is concerned with two closely related problems. The "outwitting problem" is about tricks to gain the upper hand over some other person and about tricks to prevent being cheated oneself. It seems clear that Kauṭilya and other artha or dharma authors had a very good understanding of this problem. One should make clear at the outset that words like "cheating", "honest behaviour" or the like do not necessarily imply a moral judgement, neither on the part of the Old Indian authors nor on the part of the present one.
Economic principal-agent theory is also about another aspect of asymmetric information. The person in command of superior knowledge may not always be able to benefit from this knowledge. Indeed, if he needs the uninformed side to agree to some mutually beneficial venture, asymmetric information may harm the informed side by preventing this venture. We call this the "gains-from-trade problem" of principal-agent theory. We conjecture that there was no explicit (openly expressed) understanding of the gains-from-trade problem in Old India. Of course, this is difficult to prove; a text dealing with the gains-from-trade problem might just have escaped our attention.
In any case, a society's "understanding" of a problem or a solution to that problem need not always be present in an explicit manner. Hayek 3 has stressed that useful institutions (such as markets or specific judicial rules) are often not invented or not even fully understood by us humans. Instead, they spontaneously develop and are kept if they prove useful. In this sense, institutions may embody "intelligent" solutions. We think that the "Varuṇa rule" specified in the Manusmṛti is a suitable illustration of such implicit understanding. The "Varuṇa rule" stipulates that the king is to throw confiscated property into water. This apparent waste of resources calls out for an explanation. The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we explain the two problems of principal-agent theory in detail. We then turn to the outwitting problem in Section 3. The gains-from-trade problem is addressed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Principal-agent theory
It may seem obvious that a person A who possesses some relevant information not available to another person P stands to benefit from this superior knowledge. Relatedly, a person A who cheats another person P will typically profit from that action. This is certainly the idea behind some part of the Old Indian artha literature, Kauṭilya's Arthaśāstra (KAŚ) as well as the fable collections Pañcatantra and Hitopadeśa.
This discussion forms one important branch of economic theory, called principal-agent theory. It deals with situations where an economic actor, called the "principal", wants another actor, the "agent", to perform certain actions. 4 The agent knows about his actions while the principal does not. This state of affairs is called "asymmetric information".
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A big chunk of principal-agent theory is concerned with "hidden action" problems. Consider the example of a firm (the principal) that has employed a worker (the agent) who may diligently work in the principal's interest or pursue his own interests instead. If and insofar the principal cannot observe the effort exerted by the agent, the principal's problem is how to supervise or remunerate the worker so that the interests of the latter are aligned with those of the former. We term this the "outwitting problem" of principal-agent theory. The agent tries to outwit the principal: he aspires a high reward without effort. The principal tries not to be outwitted: he wants to make the agent work hard for as little remuneration as possible.
Consider Figure 1 . The agent (denoted by A) moves first. He may try to outwit the principal and earn S A while the principal would suffer and obtain the negative payoff of − S P . S may stand for "stealing" or "scam" and there is no harm in assuming S A = S P . The dishonest agent is punished with a fine F. Thus, if the principal is carefree (does not check whether he is taken advantage of), the payoffs are − S P for the principal and S A − F for the agent. If, however, the principal is attentive (or careful), he can prevent being outwitted. Then, the cost C of being careful has to be borne by him, while the agent suffers the fine and does not profit from his cheating attempt. In contrast, an honest agent strives for a mutually beneficial deal that yields some gain G A to him and the gain G P to the principal.
4 A second branch of principal-agent theory (called adverse selection) deals with a principal who wants the agent to reveal information held by that agent. Outwitting problems for adverse selection are dealt with in Old Indian texts. For example, the Hitopadeśa (see Törzsök 2007: 271) offers this advice: "A brahmin, a warrior or a relative should never be appointed as treasurer." This is an outwitting problem: Do not employ anybody who might not be able or willing to honour your trust. In contrast, we are not aware of any Old Indian gains-from-trade problems within the adverse-selection framework. 
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We assume that all parameters are positive and also S A > G A and S P > C. Figure 1 rests one the premise that the principal knows whether the agent tries to outwit him or not. If the agent is not honest (i. e., tries to outwit the principal), the latter will be careful by S P > C. In contrast, the honest agent can expect a carefree principal by C > 0. Therefore, the agent prefers to be honest and the agents obtain their gains G P and G A , respectively.
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We now turn to Figure 2 and the case of imperfect information. The principal (who chooses between carefree and careful behaviour) does not know whether the agent is honest (aspiring the mutual gains) or tries to outwit (going after the scam payoff S A ). Instead, with some probability ω the agent tries to outwit the principal and with probability 1 − ω the agent is honest.
7 This probability is known to the principal. Then, the principal is carefree if his expected payoff for carefree behaviour is at least as large as his expected payoff for careful behaviour, i. e., if 6 The game-theoretic solution procedure described for the analysis of Figure 1 is called 'backward induction' (see, for example, Gibbons 1992: 55-61) . 7 Again, we apply backward induction, this time with a probability for trying to outwit. One may think of Abraham Lincoln's famous quote: "You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time." From a purist point of view, one may argue that we do not have imperfect information here. Indeed, the standard procedure in principal-agent theory would assume "information partitions" where the principal's one is coarser than the agent's one. However, for the purpose of this paper, there is no need to go into these game-theoretic details.
We now turn to the agent's best outwitting probability. Clearly, it is never optimal for the agent to choose an outwitting probability that makes the principal careful. Then, the agent would not obtain S A − F. Therefore, we can focus on a carefree principal and the agent's expected payoff
In order to find the agent's best decision, we need to distinguish between two situations. We either have a relatively small fine F < S A − G A or a relatively large fine F > S A − G A . In the small-fine situation (where S A − F > G A holds), the agent chooses the maximal outwitting probability that keeps the principal carefree:ω
for the agent. If the fine is relatively large,ω = 0 is best for the agent. The payoffs are G P and G A , respectively.
At a first glance, imperfect information seems a problem only for the uninformed side (the principal). In fact, however, the possibility of outwitting may quickly turn into a problem for the informed side (the agent), also. After all, the principal might shy away from dealing with the agent and thus prevent a mutually benefical arrangement. Thus, there is a related "gains-from-trade problem": How can a hard-working agent convince the principal that he, indeed, is very useful so that the principal is prepared to pay a high wage or to employ him at all?
Figure 2: The outwitting problem for imperfect information.
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We analyse this with the help of Figure 3 . Here, the principal has the choice of entering into a contractual agreement with the agent. If he does not, he obtains a zero payoff.
If the fine is relatively large, the principal foresees the outwitting probabilitŷ ω = 0 and can earn the payoff G P > 0 by contracting with the agent. If, however, the fine is relatively small, the outwitting probability isω = C S P and, hence, contracting with the agent pays only for
Inversely, the principal (the uninformed side) does not enter into a deal with the agent -if the fine is smaller than the difference between the agent's scam payoff and the agent's gain from honest trading (F < S A − G A Þ, -if the principal's gain G P from dealing with the agent is relatively small, -if the principal's cost of careful behaviour C is relatively large and his scam payoff S P relatively small (remember our assumption S P > C).
Therefore, the agent may hope for a large fine (the first bullet point) if he cannot otherwise convince the principal to deal with him (the second and third bullet point).
Figure 3: The gains-from-trade problem for imperfect information.
3 Principal-agent theory's outwitting problem
Hitopadeśa/ Pañcatantra
In the Pañcatantra, trust and the outwitting problem are often dealt with. See, for example, 'He is my friend!' -is that any reason to trust a scoundrel? 'I have done him a great many favors!' -that counts for nothing! 'This man is my very own relative!' -that's an old folk tale! People are driven by money alone, no matter how small.
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The Pañcatantra's "central message" is that "craft and deception constitute the major art of government". But: "Deception, of course, is a double-edged sword; it is important to use it against others, but just as importantly one must guard against its use by others against oneself. So, in a sense, even the losers provide counterexamples". 9 We refer the reader to section 2 where the attempt of outwitting (on the agent's part) and the care taken by the principal to prevent this has been formally modelled.
The serious problem of asymmetric information is neatly summarized in the Hitopadeśa:
If you have to cross an impassable ocean, you have a boat; when darkness comes, you have a lamp; […] Thus there is no problem in the world for which the Creator has not carefully invented some solution. But when it comes to countering a wicked person's way of thinking, it seems to me that even the Creator has failed in his efforts.
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Turning to the model of section 2, we can translate the principal's impossibility of reading the agent's mind into large cost C of being careful. Then, C S P is large and the principal is likely to be defrauded.
Thus, the fables provide ample material for the outwitting problem. In contrast, we did not manage to find gains-from-trade problems in the two fable collections.
Kauṭilya
Kauṭilya is a foremost expert on outwitting problems or so it seems from the evidence found by the current author. For example, in Arthaśāstra 4.8,
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Kauṭilya advises the king to investigate wrongdoings "through interrogation and torture" and suggests in KAŚ 1.10 12 to find out about "the ministers' integrity […] through secret tests". Trying to cheat and preventing to be cheated upon is the aim of KAŚ 7.17, 13 where Kauṭilya discusses peace making through hostages and writes: "The taking of a kinsman or a chief constitutes a hostage. In this event, the one who gives a traitorous minister or a traitorous offspring is the one who outwits. One who does the opposite is outwitted". 14 It is from this translation by Olivelle that the "outwitting" problem has obtained its name. 15 Again, gains-from-trade problems were not found in the Arthaśāstra. Sometimes, the actions that someone expects another one to perform (or the actions that the first expects the second to avoid) are in line with dharma texts. Viṣṇu 5 17 lists the punishments to be administered by the king in some detail, for "crimes deserving capital punishments", for "offences against upper classes by lower classes", for "verbal abuse and assault", for "sexual crimes", and so on. A king's responsibility for punishment is clear from many texts. If the king fails to administer Punishment tirelessly on those who ought to be punished, the stronger will grill the weak like fish on a spit yadi na praṇayed rājā daṇḍaṃ daṇḍyeṣv atandritaḥ | śūle matsyān ivāpakṣyan durbalān balavattarāḥ
The Indian texts now start to worry about the king's incentives to admimister justice in the correct manner. As the famous Latin saying goes: "quis custodiet custodes ipsos", i. Varuṇa is the one who disciplines kings when they act wrongly with respect to men śāstā hi varuṇo rājñāṃ mithyā vyācaratāṃ nṛṣu Thus, the subjects in Indian artha and dharma books are monitored and punished (if need be) in order to make them act according to dharma. So far, we have looked at "Varuṇa as chastiser of kings" from the perspective of two-level punishment. We now suggest to take the point of view of principal-agent theory. In that perspective, the king is the agent who administers justice towards his subjects, the principals. In terms of our model in section 2, the subjects "deal" with the king (the agent) by living in his realm or choosing to settle there. The king (as agent) then may outwit his subjects (the principals) by administering justice in a selfserving manner. Finally, the subjects may employ some cost and scrutinize the king's handling of justice.
In this setting, the role of Vaṛuna consists of fining the misbehaving king. One might argue (with Manu) that the king will fulfill his rājadharma if he is afraid of the chastiser Vaṛuna. Indeed, this is in line with the role of the fine F in our model in section 2. However, for the "Vaṛuna the chastiser" argument to go through, it is not the king's belief that is relevant. Rather, the subjects need to believe that the king is a believer. Thus, we need second-order beliefs 22 which are more difficult to uphold than first-order ones.
If the belief argument is too facile, we need to supply additional arguments of how Varuṇa's punishment might work. Does it imply that the king, the most powerful agent himself, would somehow need to punish himself? Against this idea, Kane 23 has already opined that "these prescriptions [...] were counsels of perfection and must have been futile. No king would ordinarily fine himself". He then refers to medieval texts where the king is understood as a "subordinate chief". Then, it is not Varuṇa himself who is doing the punishing, but the overlord, instead. This is a good explanation, as far as it goes. However, it just pushes up the problem one level. After all, how would, then, an unjust overlord be brought to justice? Derrett 24 criticizes Kane by pointing to "the hieratic element in ancient Indian society". While Derrett does not explain how exactly he envisions the priestly involvement in this matter, we also think it best not to construe Manu or Kauṭilya in this way. We will take up this problem and Kane's dictum ("no king would ordinarily fine himself") in section 4.
Why Varuṇa?
Before doing so, we turn to the question of why Varuṇa, and not some other god from the Hindu pantheon, is responsible for the punishment of kings. Here, we can follow Oberlies 25 back to Vedic times: Indra is one of the most important Vedic gods. He is especially known as the slayer of the demon Vṛta, an act by which the waters were freed. Indra's world is a raw, unfinished business. It is Varuṇa who then determines the sun's orbit and the rivers' paths. Analogously, Indra and Varuṇa are involved in the Vedic clans' living. Oberlies stresses the phases of yoga (yoking the horses in order to move to new areas in fighting mode) and kṣema (peaceful settlement). Indra is associated with yoga. He is invoked by the Vedic clans that hope for victory. In contrast, Varuṇa and other related gods see to the orderly functioning of settled human society. We claim that the gains-from-trade problem might not have been obvious to Old Indian thinkers on dharma and artha. Be that as it may, this problem was "known" by the institutions in the sense of Hayek (see the introduction). Some Indian dharma texts mention the punishment of confiscating property (see also the conclusion 243 A good king must never take the property of someone guilty of a grievous sin causing loss of caste; if he takes it out of greed, he becomes tainted with the same sin. 244 He should offer that fine to Varuṇa by casting it into water, or present it to a Brahmin endowed with learning and virtue. 245 Varuṇa is the lord of punishment, for he holds the rod of punishment over kings; and a Brahmin who has mastered the Veda is the lord of the entire world. 246 When a king refrains from taking the fines of evildoers, in that land are born in due course men with long lives; 247 the farmers' crops ripen, each as it was sown; children do not die; and no deformed child is born. The property of both the culprit and its relatives could be confiscated according to a Tamil inscription from 988 CE (see Sastri 1931 Sastri /1932 Mandlik, 1886 , vol II: 1237 -1238 Superficially, these passages are clear and do not present any translational difficulties. 39 In Manu, the king is strongly advised not to keep any confiscated property for himself or his treasury. Instead, he should throw it into the water or give it to the Brahmins. Manu expounds the negative consequences of the king's confiscating for himself (in 9.243) and the positive consequences of not doing so (in 9.246-247). We call the prescription to give the fine "to Varuṇa by casting it into water" the "Varuṇa clause". Strictly speaking, "casting into water" and confiscation are contradictory terms. Lat. fiscus means treasury and confiscation hence "adjoining the treasury". From this perspective, one might say that Manu 9.242-247 forbids confiscation. However, we will understand confiscation as asset forfeiture or asset seizure, irrespective of how the property taken 40 is dealt with. Derrett (1975b: 193 , fn 1) points to this rule about the "destination of the fine". The reading given here is to be preferred to the one found in Sastri (1982, part I: 298) : rājñā nyāyena yo daṇḍo 'gṛhīto varuṇāya tam. 39 The commentaries on Manu (see Mandlik, 1886 , vol II: 1237 -1239 Derrett, 1975a : 189-190, Derrett, 1975b ) are short and do not mention specific problems. 40 In Nāradasmṛti 18.12 (in Lariviere, 2003: 222, 426 ) and in Manu 8.399 (in Olivelle, 2005: 188, 740) we have the root hṛ. In contrast, Manu 10.96 (in Olivelle, 2005: 213, 829 ) uses the expression nirdhanaṃ kṛ. In the Lekhapaddhati-Lekhapañcāśīkā (Gujarat, 13 th to 15 th century), we have vyāṣedha which is translated by Strauch (2002: 157-158, 351-352) as confiscation, but refers to a tax in a specific area (Strauch, 2002: 351, fn. 1) . Confiscation in the proper sense of the word is expressed by rāja-saṃjātyāṃ kṛ (Strauch, 2002: 158, 352-353) . Both these uses do not refer to confiscation in the context of criminal law.
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The Arthaśāstra also mentions water, but here, Kauṭilya does not seriously entertain the possibility of casting the fines (this time to be paid by the king himself) into the water. Instead, "place it in water for Varuṇa, and then give it to Brāhmaṇas" seems to be a short description of a ceremony by which the king is cleansed of his judicial mistake.
Similarly, the Manu commentator Rāghavānanda seems to consider the Brahmins as the final receivers:
Indeed, however, aiming at Varuṇa, it should be given to a Brahmin. Therefore, Yājñavalkya required expiation for the Brahmin who accepts that wealth vastutas tu varuṇāya saṃkalpya viprāyopapādayet ata eva tad dhanaṃ svīkartur viprasya prāyascittam āha yājñavalkyaḥ If a person should have accepted bad things, he is cleansed by staying in a cowshed for one month, practising chastity, observing the vow to subsist only on milk, and engaging in Gāyatrī prayer.
goṣṭhe vasan brahmacārī māsam ekaṃ payovrataḥ gāyatrījapyanirataḥ śuddhyate 'satpratigrahāt However, it seems unlikely that the property taken from guilty people and given to a Brahmin come under the heading of "bad things". Also, while Yājñavalkya recommends confiscation (see conclusion), the giving of the confiscated property to Brahmins is not found in that text. In any case, some Manu commentators understand "casting into water" as a serious option. For example, Medhātithi requests to meditate on the receiver Varuṇa:
meditating "this is to Varuṇa" in one's mind, he [the king] should throw it into waters varunāyedam iti manasā dhyāyann apsu dadyāt
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Why should Manu demand that the king does not keep the confiscated property taken from the offenders? Is it not pure waste to throw the property into the water? Of course, one might point to the alternative of giving the property to Brahmins. After all, Brahmins do often benefit from unclaimed property. If a treasure-trove is found, Viṣṇu 3. [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] 44 lets the Brahmins obtain 5/12, 1/4, 1/2, Now, in his position relative to his subjects, the king is the agent who knows best whether he acts justly. How can he, even if well-intended, convince the subjects? Just saying: "I am a just king" will generally not suffice. In game-theory parlance, this would just be "cheap talk" and hence not credible.
Here, the Varuṇa clause may help the king to "prove" that he is a good king, a king who would not take property as a fine in order to enrich himself or in order to fill his depleted treasury. The best way to do this would then be a ritual, with Brahmins performing the rites and many onlookers. Indeed, Chwe 46 advances the interesting idea that rituals serve the purpose of producing "common knowledge", here, the common knowledge of a just king. 47 We now return to Kane's assertion that "[n]o king would ordinarily fine himself". From the perspective of the gains-from-trade problem one might reply: Maybe, he would not, but he would like to be able to. Indeed, section 2 shows that a high fine may lead the agent to deal honestly. And this will often be in the agent's own interest, earning the payoff G A rather than zero. Varuṇa, the chastiser of kings, may be of some help. But, if that is not enough, the king has to incur some cost, for example by offering the confiscated property "to Varuṇa by casting it into water".
Conclusions
It is very difficult not to be impressed by the social insights that are present in Indian texts, explicitly and implicitly. It is the thesis of this paper that, in the realm of principal-agent theory, Kauṭilya, the fable writers, and others had a clear understanding of outwitting problems: How to find out about the enemy's intention and prevent the enemy from finding out about one's own plans, how to outwit and not to be outwitted. With respect to the gains-from-trade problem, the relevant knowledge was embodied in some rules, but probably not properly understood.
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So far, the Varuṇa clause has not gained the attention it deserves. Kane 49 mentions Manu 9.242, but does not offer any comments beyond those dealt with above. Interestingly, the clause present in Manu is not to be found in other mūlasmṛtis we looked at: 46 Chwe 2001. 47 Common knowledge is said to be present between actors A and B if A knows something, B knows that A knows it, A knows that B knows that A knows etc. ad infinitum. 48 Sihag (2007: 41) is certainly overdoing his praise for Kauṭilya while playing down the advances made in game theory: "Although Kautilya does not provide any formal analysis, his approach contains almost all the ingredients of a [sic, HW] game theory. He was certainly not aware of the numerous new jargons, such as sequential rationality, [...] which have been added to the vocabulary during the past few decades to study strategic interactions." 49 Kane 1973: 404. Contrary to the above table, one may argue that both Arthaśāstra 4.13.42 and Yājñavalkya II.307 deal with a variant of the Varuṇa clause. However, these authors deal with punishments for kings who do not justly punish.
Confiscation
Varuṇa clause In contrast, the Varuṇa clause is about property punishments inflicted by the king. One may criticize this paper for not comparing different possible methods of instilling confidence into the king's just behaviour (but see the discussion in section 3.3.1). After all, the Varuṇa clause is only one such method (if the current author is correct in this regard). Our main excuse is that a list of all these methods is not at hand. And even with such a list, a relative evaluation might prove very difficult. In that sense, the paper is more modest than one may hope for.
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